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I. INTRODUCTION
Rent concessions-in theory a foregoing of money-ironically
have become a new income source for Texas landlords. Although
there is nothing wrong with discounting prices, there is something
wrong with re-imposing that discount on a breaching tenant. The re-
imposed rent concession is a penalty that the landlord would not have
collected in the routine performance of the contract and as a penalty,
violates one of the oldest edicts in Anglo-American contract law.
This article arose from advice given and brief services rendered
to clients in a landlord-tenant matter. Using the facts and documents
from that dispute, this article reviews the history of contract penalties
and their distinction from liquidated damages and analyzes that rule's
application to rent concessions. This analysis demonstrates that rent
concessions, when re-imposed on the breaching tenant, are clear
violations of a centuries-old Anglo-American ban on contract
penalties. The article concludes with a short speculation into the
reasons that these issues are not being litigated.
II. RENT CONCESSIONS AND THE BREACHING TENANT
Like most consumer transactions, rent is subject to market forces,
at least in states such as Texas that do not regulate residential rent
prices. When the supply of apartments exceeds current demand,
landlords have two choices. First, they can collectively establish fixed
* LL.M. 1983 Columbia University School of Law. J.D. 1978 University of Tulsa.
B.A. 1973 Oklahoma State University.
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prices to support the existing rent structure, risking civil suits and
criminal prosecution under state and federal competition laws.'
Second, landlords can lower the rent. A cynic would contend that
landlords mix these solutions, but this article will assume that
landlords are choosing only the second option. If Texas landlords-or
landlords in specific markets, such as the Dallas-Fort Worth
Metroplex-are not fixing prices, rent is controlled by the ongoing
dynamic of market forces.
Landlords, and for that matter tenants, care little for this market
dynamic. They care instead about personal wealth, which landlords
promote by maximizing rent and which tenants promote by
minimizing it. In the past few years, landlords in Texas, and no doubt
in other states, have devised a means of maximizing wealth by using
form leases that entice tenants with a monthly discount off the
"market rent," but there is a follow-up clause re-imposing that
discount if the tenant breaches. Until recently, relying on rent
collections at the point of breach was not lucrative. But with the
increasing success of debt-collection practices,' the breaching tenant
may well be a new source of income. No data is available to determine
what percentage of landlord income is produced in this manner, but
the popularity of the practice suggests that it works both as a strong-
arm incentive for tenants to remain and as a potential profit if tenants
do not. This article is more than an isolated legal argument that a
lease term violates the law. It involves people, and more importantly,
people who are partly in the wrong. They have breached an
agreement and owe damages. The question is how much.
The following fact scenario is supported in the author's records?
1. E.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2000); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.20-.21 (Vernon 2002).
2. Collection company Unifund is an example. See, e.g., James McNair, Bad Debts
Very, Very Good for Bill Collector of Last Resort, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 23, 2003,
at 1D, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/11/23/bizunifund.23.html ("[C]lass action
lawsuits filed in Texas and Chicago claimed Unifund is chasing outdated debts. In the
pending Texas case, two plaintiffs say Unifund bought their credit-card debt, freshened up
the delinquency dates by a year and provided them to Experian Information Solutions, one
of the nation's three big credit-rating firms."). Unifund's own website provides more
examples. See Unifund, The Smarter Approach to Debt Investment and Portfolio
Management, http://www.unifund.com/aboutunifund/history.aspx (last visited Feb 28,
2007) ("Unifund popularized the concept that long-delinquent distressed debt is
regenerative."); Unifund, The Smarter Approach to Debt Investment and Portfolio
Management http://www.unifund.com/business/debtpurchases.aspx (last visited Feb 28,
2007) ("We purchase charged-off debt at all stages of default: [n]ewly defaulted[;] [f]reshly
charged-off[;j [p]ost-primary[;] [p]ost-secondary[;] [p]ost-tertiary and beyond.").
3. Readers will note that this example is limited to rent concessions involving
reductions in monthly rent as opposed to upfront concessions of one or more months rent.
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Names, locations, and exact dates are changed to protect
confidentiality, but all essential facts are true. Pam Martin is a twenty-
six-year old single mother who now lives with her parents. Pam had
been sharing an apartment with a co-worker. The apartment complex
leased them a two-bedroom apartment for a fourteen-month period
with a form prepared by the Texas Apartment Association. The
lease's terms included provisions claiming: (1) the apartment had a
"market rate" of $975 a month, (2) the tenants would receive a "rent
concession" that would give them a $200 a month discount, and (3) if
the tenants breached-at least any breach involving a move-out-the
tenants would owe rent of $975 a month for the remaining months in
the term and $200 a month for the months the tenants had honored
the lease. The lease had other damages provisions such as a reletting
fee of $824, late fees, and a possible clean-up charge. Pam and her
roommate signed the lease and initialed each page, purporting to
represent that they had read and discussed each of the clauses relating
to the discounted rent. Pam's parents co-signed as guarantors.
Pam and her roommate moved into the apartment in June 2004.
In October 2004, Pam's roommate accepted a job in another city and
moved. When Pam asked if she could move into a one-bedroom
apartment, the landlord rightly refused. Pam moved out at the
beginning of December 2004 and moved into her parents' home with a
little less than nine months left on the fourteen-month lease. In
January 2005, Pam's father received a collection letter demanding
$10,400. The demand also stated that the delinquent account would be
sent to credit-reporting-service Experian, that it would be posted
there for up to seven years, and it would not be updated until the
demand was paid in full. Read literally, this demand stated that even if
the landlord was able to find a new tenant, which he did, the reported
debt of $10,400 would not be changed. True to this reading, neither
the collection company nor the landlord changed the bad credit report
when the apartment was relet two months later.
Pam and her parents ignored the letter. More than a year later,
Pam's parents were negotiating to buy a new house, and their
financing was refused when the parents' credit report showed the bad
debt for $10,400. The Martins sought legal advice. Letters from their
The upfront rent waivers are likely penalties as well because they involve the same windfall
for the landlord over the term of the lease. See, e.g., Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens of Minn.,
Inc., No. 95 C 5374, 1996 WL 675787, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1996) (mem.) (holding a
commercial lease with seven-month re-imposable rent concession to be a penalty). But the
author's documents support only the monthly discount, and this article is accordingly
limited to that example.
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attorney to the collection agency and the landlord reduced the debt
from $10,400 to $4,400. This reflected the apartment's reletting, but
the landlord continued to impose the $824 reletting fee (which the
Martins did not contest) and a $1,400 rent concession for a seven-
month period (the five months Pam lived there and the two months
before reletting).
The collection company also responded to the Martins' demand
for damages under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
similar Texas laws. Specifically, the collection company inquired how
an attorney could possibly make claims on behalf of people who did
not pay debts. The answer, of course, is that the Martins had an
obligation to pay the landlord's actual damages, but not a penalty. The
fact that the Martins might be at fault did not entitle the landlord to a
$1,400 penalty. The collection agent's view is no doubt one reason that
breaching tenants fail to seek legal advice on these consumer-debt
issues-they see themselves as deadbeats and assume that they owe
not only what they would have paid but the extra damages as well.
The collection agent's rhetoric underscored this theme.
After another round of letter negotiations, the collection
company abruptly declared the account "inactive."5 Neither the
collection company nor the landlord responded to the Martins'
request that "inactive" be defined. The Martins are not currently
being pursued and will likely not file suit to reduce or clear this debt.
Interestingly, significant legal research yielded no litigation on similar
issues.6 Without judicial review, can we conclude that the re-imposed
4. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2)(A), (8), (10) (2000);
see also TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.304(8) (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2006); Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.45(5),
17.46(b)(7), 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
5. A second letter from the Martins' attorney offered to set off the Martins' debt
against their claim for debt-collection damages under state and federal law. See supra note
4. This offer assumed that the Martins' debt included the two-months rent at $775 a month
plus the $824 reletting fee and other incidental fees but did not include the rent concession
of $1,400 for the seven-month period. The collection company responded that it had
reclassified the account as "inactive" and that any further communications should be made
with the landlord. In a third letter, the Martins' attorney asked that "inactive account" be
defined. Would it later become active? Would the debt allegation be removed from the
Martins' credit reports? The collection agency did not respond. The landlord had not
responded to any of the correspondence and ignored one additional letter.
6. Multiple searches in Westlaw, Lexis, and other databases in the period May-
September 2006, using the term "rent concession" alone and "rent concession w/250
penalty" failed to produce any cases from state or federal courts in Texas regarding rent
concessions, either residential or commercial, as penalties. The same searches failed on a
national basis as well. The search did reveal an unreported federal decision involving a
commercial lease in which the landlord sought to recover a seven month rent concession
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rent concession in Pam's lease is an invalid penalty? The answer
seems clear but is analyzed in section II's discussion of the centuries-
old penalty ban and section III's analysis of that ban's application to
the rent concession. The re-imposed rent discount does not reimburse
the landlord for any money it would have received had Pam remained
there and paid through the lease's end. Nor does it reflect any other
loss, tangible or otherwise, suffered by the landlord. It is nothing more
than an incentive to perform, an ad terrorem clause that Anglo-
American contract law has rejected for four centuries.
III. THE PENALTY PROSCRIPTION IN TEXAS
Historians speculate that in pre-Roman legal systems, penalties
were the only remedy for breach of contract The Romans continued
this practice and passed it on to nascent legal systems throughout the
Empire, including Britannia.8 As English common law emerged, it
rejected the Roman view in favor of the idea that the goal in contract
damages is to make the promisee whole-to compensate for the
actual loss sustained, reimburse what the promisee would have
received had the contract been performed, and mitigate any incidental
damages! Penalty damages originated as penal bonds that were
forfeited upon breach, but when English law banned penalties
outright, clauses with the same function appeared as stipulated
damages.'0 Because valid liquidated damage clauses also appear as
worth $81,000 because of a dispute over the payment of the last month's rent in a sixty-one
month lease. Raffel, 1996 WL 675787, at *2. The court held that "while the contract gives
the windfall to the plaintiff, Illinois law takes it away." Id. at *3.
7. See William H. Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures Before Peachy v. The Duke of
Somerset, 29 HARV. L. REV. 117, 119-25 (1915); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 11-13 (3d ed. 2004). Sir Henry Maine's well-known treatise
offers little more on pre-Roman contracts than speculation that, prior to the Roman
Empire, various jurisdictions' laws of contract were merely rudimentary attempts to
resolve disputes among equals; inequals could not have mutually-enforceable agreements.
See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 312-14 (1861).
8. See Loyd, supra note 7, at 119-25 (detailing early history of the penal bond); 2 SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 223-26 (2d ed. 1903) (discussing use of penalty
clauses in early English contracts); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 633-34, 677-78 (5th ed. 1956) (detailing early action of debt and
rejection of penalties); see generally 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 11-17 (discussing the
early history of contract actions).
9. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 302-03; see generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344-56 (1981) (detailing goals of contemporary American
contract damages).
10. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 302-04; Loyd, supra note 7, at 119, 121-22.
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stipulations for payment upon breach, courts had to devise
distinctions." In modern American law, those distinctions have
become both uniform and universal. The widespread nature of this
rule throughout the United States is reflected both in treatises and a
number of cases. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.2 may be the
best example. There, Judge Posner relied on Illinois law but made the
point that it reflected the common American principle that to be
enforceable:
liquidation of damages must be a reasonable estimate at the
time of contracting of the likely damages from breach, and the
need for estimation at that time must be shown by reference to
the likely difficulty of measuring the actual damages from a
breach of contract after the breach occurs. If damages would be
easy to determine then, or if the estimate greatly exceeds a
reasonable upger estimate of what the damages are likely to be,
it is a penalty.
The penalty rule does not vary in Texas law. Texas courts applied
the rule as early as 1854 in Durst v. Swift, an action for damages for
the defendant's failure to deliver various land titles in several counties
in southeast Texas.14 The contract stipulated the damages, and the
defendant objected that this was a penalty. 5 The trial court disagreed
that it was a penalty, and in upholding that decision, the Texas
Supreme Court recited the rule from English and American sources,
distinguishing proper liquidated damages from penalties:
Where the parties, in the agreement, have expressly declared
the sum to be intended as a forfeiture, or penalty, and no other
intention is to be gathered from the instrument; where it is
doubtful whether it was intended as a penalty, or not; and a
certain damage, or debt, less than the penalty, is made payable
on the face of the instrument; where the agreement was
evidently made for the attainment of another object, to which
the sum specified is wholly collateral; where the agreement
contains several matters of different degrees of importance, and
yet the sum named is payable for the breach of any, even the
least; and where the contract is not under seal, and the damages
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a. Unlike penalties,
liquidated damages are estimates of actual losses that will likely be sustained in breach. See
id. at § 356 cmt. b. The actual damages must be difficult to measure or prove, and the
stipulated damages must be made at the time of contracting and be reasonable. See id.
12. 769 F.2d 1284,1288 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 1289-90.
14. 11 Tex. 273, 274-75 (1854).
15. Id. at 281.
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are capable of being certainly known and estimated in all these
cases, the sum stipulated to be paid has been treated as a
penalty. 6
The last clause in the last sentence is important: "[I]n all these cases,
the sum stipulated to be paid has been treated as a penalty.' 17 The
factors listed in this paragraph are not cumulative. 8 Any one factor
can defeat the fixed damages provision in a contract. 9 Durst shows the
ready understanding courts had in 1854 of the liquidated damages and
penalty distinction. It was developed law, easily imported into Texas's
nascent judicial system. Durst further shows that in spite of the
presumption that stipulated damages are illegal penalties, liquidated
damages are appropriate where, as in that case, "the damages are
uncertain, and are not capable of being ascertained by any satisfactory
and known rule.,
20
Texas courts considered the rule several times over the years, but
Stewart v. Basey2-a 1952 case-may provide the best and most
current statement. All the more appropriate for this discussion, it
involved a rental agreement.22 Stewart was a commercial landlord in
Austin.23 In 1949, he leased three buildings on Congress Street in
Austin to Basey for a stated term of five years.24 The written lease in
fact stated a term spanning six years, although the court resolved the
questions without worrying about that discrepancy. 25 The rent was
$325 a month, and the lease began on January 1, 1949.26 Basey only
paid through November of that year and then moved out.27 Stewart
then sued, seeking to collect on the lease's clause that stipulated $150
damages for each remaining month on the lease.2 Importantly, the
damage provision applied for any breach of the lease.29 The trial court
16. Id. at 282.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 281-82.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. 245 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1952).
22. Id. at 485.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The lease stated:
The failure to pay any monthly installment of rental when such installment is due
shall terminate this lease at the option of Lessors. The failure of Lessee to make
said payment or payments or the breach of this contract otherwise by him shall
render him liable to Lessors, as agreed liquidated damages, the sum of One
2007]
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found the damage provision to be a penalty yet awarded Stewart
$38.50 for damage to a door, but the court of appeals reversed that
ruling.30 In affirming the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court
examined Texas case law, starting with Eakin v. Scott, and noted the
wide agreement on this rule in the United States as reflected in the
Restatement of Contracts and leading treatises.' The Stewart rule
summarized Texas law that "to be enforceable as liquidated damages
the damages must be uncertain and the stipulation must be
reasonable."32 A further discussion drawn from Williston adds the
element that reasonableness means a good faith effort to assess
otherwise unquantifiable damages.33 Perhaps more important, Stewart
states the underlying policy against contract penalties or any remedy
that over-compensates for contract breaches:
The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a
contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually
sustained. By the operation of that rule a party generally should
be awarded neither less nor more than his actual damages. A
party has no right to have a court enforce a stipulation which
violates the principle underlying that rule. In those cases in
which courts enforce stipulations of the parties as a measure of
damages for the breach of covenants, the principle of just
compensation is not abandoned and another principle
substituted therefor. What courts really do in those cases is to
permit the parties to estimate in advance the amount of
damages, provided they adhere to the principle of just
compensation. 34
In summarizing this policy drawn from the Restatement of Contracts,
Hundred Fifty (150) Dollars per month for each and every month of the
unexpired term of this lease which shall become due and payable when the
option to terminate this lease is exercised or at the time of the breach of this
contract otherwise by Lessee if any, and the payment thereof be secured by lien
on the property of Lessee in said Store Buildings at said time.
Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 485-87. "Volumes have been written on the question of when a
stipulated damage provision of a contract should be enforced as liquidated damages and
when enforcement should be denied because it is a penalty provision." Id. at 485-87 (citing
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932); 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON AND GEORGE J.
THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 783 (1936); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 151 (1935)).
32. Id. at 486.
33. Id.
34. Id. Stewart's limiting the measure of contract damages to just compensation for
the actual loss is consistent with Farnsworth's description of American law generally. See 3
FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 300-05. Farnsworth also discusses Jaquith v. Hudson, 5
Mich. 123 (1858). See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 301 n.3.
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the Stewart opinion stated the rule that now controls in this area and
may be the most accurate statement of judicial oversight for
contractually-stipulated damages. 5
The court then addressed the lease in front of it and found that
the $150-a-month stipulation was indeed a penalty because it far
exceeded any actual damage the landlord had suffered.36 The court
also upheld the court of appeals' reversal of the $38.50 for damages to
the door, leaving the landlord with nothing.37 But what about the
landlord's entitlement to rent at $325 a month for the remaining
months on the lease? The opinion does not tell us whether the lease
had such a covenant and does not recite the relevant law for 1952. We
do know that the landlord quickly relet the buildings by the time of
trial.38 We also know, if the opinion reflects the court record, that the
landlord did not seek such damages for any time the building was
empty but instead sought only the $150 a month for the five or more
years remaining on the lease.39 That is, the landlord pursued only his
remedy under the stipulated-damages provision, and it failed because
it did not realistically measure any actual damage the landlord had
suffered.
Reported Texas decisions have cited Stewart at least two dozen
times, some invoking the rule, some distinguishing the facts and
finding appropriate liquidated damages, but none questioning the
rule. Two cases merit short discussion. In 1991, the Texas Supreme
Court applied Stewart's bar on contract penalties in Phillips v.
Phillips.4° When Harry and Martha Phillips divorced after thirty-two
years of marriage, they placed their considerable community
property-mostly based on oil and gas holdings-into a limited
partnership. 1 Harry was the general partner, and Martha was the only
limited partner.42 Harry's duties included the distribution of funds to
himself and Martha and various routine reporting and fiduciary
duties.43 The partnership agreement included a clause that if Harry
breached his duties, he would pay liquidated damages of ten times
Martha's actual loss.44 Harry did breach by short-funding the
35. See id. at 305-08; Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 487.
36. Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 487.
37, Id.
38. See id. at 485.
39. See id.
40. 820 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1991).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 786-87.
44. Id. at 787.
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distributions and overcharging for his own expenses." The trial court
did not enforce that clause, and both the court of appeals and the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed. 6 Justice Hecht's majority opinion
found the ten-time multiplier to be a penalty because it clearly
violated Stewart's two-prong rule that liquidated damages be
"incapable or difficult of estimation" and a good faith assessment of
actual damages.47 To the contrary, the Phillips' agreement linked the
ten-time multiplier to an initial determination of actual damages. This,
the Phillips majority concluded, was "on its face .. . an unenforceable
penalty. '"
The Phillips dissent, and the majority's rejection of that
argument, adds an important footnote to the Stewart rule. When
Martha Phillips sued, Harry had failed to plead his penalty argument
as an affirmative defense. Three justices keyed their dissent to what
they argued was the clear requirement under Texas procedural rules
that matters such as this be affirmatively raised by the defense. 49 The
majority rejected this, finding an exception to the requirement of
affirmative pleading where the matter in question is illegal and
apparent on the face of the plaintiff's claim." As the court stated,
"[e]nforcement of a penalty, like enforcement of an illegal contract,
violates public policy."5
In 2006, the Texas Supreme Court made an important distinction
regarding the Stewart rule. Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd.
involved a certified question from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
involving the interpretation of the term "liquidated damages" in a
section of the Texas Property Code.52 Specifically, a seller under
certain contracts for deed faces "liquidated damages" of $250 a day
for certain violations. 3 The federal appellate court submitted
questions regarding this provision's penalty nature and whether it
required proof of actual damages. The Texas Supreme Court
explained that the Texas legislature had used the term "liquidated
damages" here to mean a penalty and that it was automatic and did
45. Id.
46. Id. at 787, 790.
47. Id. at 789.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 790-92 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 789.
51. Id. at 789-90.
52. 185 S.W.3d 427, 428 (Tex. 2005) (construing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077
(Vernon Supp. 2006)).
53. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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not require proof of actual damages.' Summarizing the Stewart rule
and distinguishing it from the statute in Flores, the court stated:
The term "liquidated damages" ordinarily refers to an
acceptable measure of damages that parties stipulate in advance
will be assessed in the event of a contract breach. The common
law and the Uniform Commercial Code have long recognized a
distinction between liquidated damages and penalties. If
damages for the prospective breach of a contract are difficult to
measure and the stipulated damages are a reasonable estimate
of actual damages, then such a provision is valid and enforceable
as "liquidated damages;" otherwise it is void as a "penalty."55
The court went on to point out that while many Texas statutes
reflected this general rule, some statutes used the term "liquidated
damages" synonymously with "penalty. 5 6 In fact, of the twelve Texas
statutes mentioning liquidated damages, nine regulate them consistent
with the Stewart rule, while three use the term liquidated damages to
create a civil penalty such as the one in Flores under the Property
Code.57
In Flores, the Texas Supreme Court may have been hasty in
labeling these provisions as nothing more than penalties. Although
the $250-a-day measure applies regardless of the property's value, this
can be characterized as a legislative attempt to award damages for
inconvenience and other loss beyond the measured monetary loss and
to do so without the complications of proof at trial. But even if the
legislature intended these "liquidated damages" as pure civil
penalties, the necessary conclusion is that the law penalizes wrongful
conduct. In any event, Flores underscores that these few statutory
usages of "liquidated damages" as penalties must be distinguished
from the centuries-old common law rule barring contract penalties.
As Flores pointed out, the law of contracts goes beyond the
common law.58 Contracts have also been regulated by statutes since
late medieval England, including one that codified the equity courts'
requirement that contract damages be limited to the actual loss
54. Flores, 185 S.W.3d at 429.
55. Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 431-32.
57. See id. at 431, 431 n.5, 432 n.7. The other two Texas statutes treating "liquidated
damages" as a penalty provision are TEXAS LABOR CODE ANNOTATED section 62.201
(Vernon 2006) (imposing liquidated damages for violations of the minimum wage law) and
TEXAS AGRICULTURE CODE ANNOTATED section 52.016(d)(1) (Vernon 2004) (allowing
a marketing association to "fix as liquidated damages specific amounts to be paid by a
member if the member breaches the marketing contract").
58. Flores, 185 S.W.3d at 431.
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sustained. 9 But what about other areas of contract law where
legislatures and uniform codes codified entire subsets of contract law?
An exhaustive answer is not feasible here, but one good example
appears in the Uniform Commercial Code and specifically in the
Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-718, governing liquidated
damages in contracts for the sale of goods.6° Section 2-718 has no
application to any discussion of residential leases, but it exemplifies
the pervasive ban on penalty damages in Anglo-American contract
law.
IV. RE-IMPOSED RENT CONCESSIONS AS PENALTIES
The Martin lease stated in clause six that tenant "will pay $975.00
per month for rent" and then in clause ten that: "Resident will receive
$200 monthly discount making monthly rental rate $775.00." A lease
addendum entitled "Rent Concession and Discount Addendum" read:
"A monthly recurring concession. The monthly Market Rent amount
will be reduced by $200 per month during the initial lease term
making the monthly rent amount $775. This rate reduction may or
may not be offered on renewal leases." Additional terms both in the
lease and the addendum stated that if tenant moved out before the
59. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 302.
60. Section 2-718 was amended in 2003, with no substantive change regarding
consumer contracts, but easing the burden of proof for plaintiffs in commercial cases. As of
the time of this publication, no states have adopted the amended version. However, this
strikeout version, taken from the official text, reflects that the U.C.C.'s rule on liquidated
damages has been consistent with the common law and did not change with the 2003
amendments. The standard and amended sections read:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount whielt that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach and, in a consumer contract, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably largc liquidatcd damagcs is void as
a-penalty. Section 2-719 determines the enforceability of a term that limits but
does not liquidate damages.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2003). Official comment 2 to the 2003 version states in part: "Under
original Section 2-718, a party seeking to enforce a liquidated damages term had to
demonstrate the difficulty of proving the loss and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
obtaining an adequate remedy. These requirement [sic] have been eliminated in
commercial contracts but are retained in consumer contracts." Id. at § 2-718 cmt. 2. In
other words, the 2003 insertion of "and, in a consumer contract" was intended to ease the
burden of proof for plaintiffs in commercial contracts who were on a more even footing
with the breaching defendant, but retain the higher burden for sellers in consumer
contracts. Official Comment 3 explains that the penultimate sentence was stricken for
redundancy. See id. at § 2-718 cmt. 3. But see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718(a)
(2004) (demonstrating that the provision fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages as
void is still present under Texas law).
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end of the lease, the concessions would be forfeited, and that if the
rent was late in any given month, the concession was forfeited for that
month, in addition to other late fees specified in the lease. The parties
agreed to these terms, evidenced by signatures on the lease and the
addendum and by initials at the bottom of each page of the lease.
Quick conclusions are easily reached here supporting both sides.
On Pam's side, the demand was significantly more than she had been
paying in rent. Any thought on her part that she would owe a couple
of months' rent after reletting was misplaced. On the landlord's side,
Pam had not only signed a lease that spelled out these damages, she
had initialed each page. Pam had breached and would now pay the
clearly-specified "market rent." Although Pam had no thought of the
illegality of penalties, her resistance was well founded. That
conclusion is supported by several points that initially seem to favor
the landlord but fail on a cursory legal or economic analysis.
First is the lease language in clause six that tenant "will pay $975
a month," modified by the language in clause ten with the $200
monthly concession, "making the monthly rent $775." So what is the
rent-$975 or $775? Keeping in mind that the contract language alone
does not determine this," the most pertinent point is that tenant was
in fact paying $775 a month. The tenant was attracted to this
apartment with an expectation of paying $775 a month, despite
language that the rent would be $975 a month in the event of breach.62
A second point is the landlord's measure of damages. If the
tenant remains in the apartment for the duration of the lease, the
landlord would collect fourteen installments of $775 and no more,
other than perhaps incidental fees at move-out. The $200 monthly
rent concession, adding up to $2,800 for the fourteen-month term of
the lease, is not a part of the performance of this contract. The
landlord collects that $2,800 concession only if tenant breaches. When
61. Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1952).
62. Closely related and undeserving of separate enumeration is the argument that the
parties had an agreement. This argument has initial validity. However the lease's terms can
be characterized either as rent or penalties, the contract is clear on the underlying point-
tenants agreed to pay an extra $2,800 in the event of early termination of the fourteen-
month lease. This conclusion is reached with no regard for law or history, but many
consumers apparently believe it. But as with other illegal aspects of contractual
agreements, courts ignore penalty clauses. The fact that the parties have agreed is
irrelevant. Had the parties not agreed, it would not be a contracted-for penalty. If this
argument had any validity, then courts and legislatures would lack power to impose terms
on contracting parties or to declare public policy in regard to contracts. The opposite is
true, and that truth extends far outside the single point of contract penalties. See, e.g., id.
("Regardless of which line of cases is followed, the courts will not be bound by the
language of the parties."); see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 11-19.
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tenant moves out early, the landlord's out-of-pocket loss of rent is
measured from a $775 base.
A third point, tying into the second, is the penalty/liquidated
damages distinction. Under American law in general, and Texas law
in particular, the test is Stewart's requirement that liquidated damage
provisions be for uncertain losses and the stipulation must be
reasonable. 6 The rent concession fails quickly here because the
landlord's actual damages are readily ascertainable. The loss is the
amount of rent the tenant would have paid, -plus actual bills such as
utilities, and various liquidated fees for reletting and cleaning. 
6
Whatever argument can be made for the rent concession as a damage
provision, it is not a measure of any loss suffered by the landlord.65
A fourth point goes to the underlying policy behind the centuries-
old ban on contract penalties. The lease's penalty clause entitles the
landlord to all $2,800, whether the tenant moves out one month early
or eleven months early. The value of the contract to the landlord
increases by $2,800 in the event of breach. Admittedly, landlords often
63. Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 486.
64. Most of these contractually-specified damages are uncontroversial, though they
may be onerous to the breaching tenant. Other than the rent concession, the other fees are
assessments of actual loss to the landlord. Ordinary rent, utilities, repair, and clean-up are
out-of-pocket losses to the lessor. The reletting fee is not necessarily a measured out-of-
pocket loss but is a valid assessment of liquidated damages. The costs of reletting the
premises include advertising and the salaries of employees who answer the phone and
show the apartment. Large apartment complexes with continual turnover will bear these
costs in any event, merely to promote full occupancy and without regard to how many
tenants left early. While breaching tenants may increase the work for employees, they
likely have little impact on the advertising costs for large apartment complexes.
Nevertheless, it is fair to spread those costs to the tenants who leave early. The costs, of
course, will vary from breach to breach, and while $824 may seem high, it is an assessment
of an actual cost to the lessor. As long as courts find it reasonable, it is an appropriate
liquidated damages award under Stewart. See id. at 486-87.
65. There are two arguments for the use of rent concessions as liquidated damages,
and both are flawed. The first is that the rent concession is liquidated damages for an
unoccupied apartment and the accompanying blight. It is doubtful that the law imposes a
duty on tenants to remain in a residence on that basis, and there is no precedent to support
this. To the extent that this duty-to-occupy has any validity, Pam's form lease did not
address this issue. To the contrary, the lease allowed the tenant to abandon the apartment
and live elsewhere as long as the rent was paid. The second argument for the rent
concession as liquidated damages is the $200 monthly concession as a late fee. In support
of this, Pam's lease stated that the concession is forfeited, for that month only, if the rent is
late. That provision, however, is in addition to a standard liquidated damages provision
regarding late rent that imposes a late fee of $50 and $5 a day until the rent is paid.
Assuming there is no ambiguity, is the extra $200 an additional late fee or merely part of
the rent? As discussed in the prior paragraph, the rent is $775 a month except in the event
of breach. The breach, in this case a nominal breach for late rent, kicks in $200 additional
rent and does so in addition to the lease's provision for a typical liquidated fee for late rent.
Again, it appears to be a penalty for breach.
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do not collect from breaching tenants, and the extra $2,800 may be
nothing more than a paper victory. But that paper victory can be
powerful in the hands of aggressive collection agencies and credit-
reporting services. Although there are no demographic studies
describing the victims of contract penalties, the practice is best
targeted at middle-class consumers who wish to protect their credit.
The author's anecdotal collection of leases in the preparation of this
article supports the idea that apartments leasing to a broad middle-
income group use this practice of rent concessions.
A final point that ostensibly supports the landlord raises a deeper
economic analysis. It can be analogized to a question of perspective: Is
the glass half-empty or half-full? The landlord may argue that the rent
concession is not a penalty at all but is instead a bonus. That is, the
lease does not impose a penalty for moving out early. It does the
opposite. It rewards the tenant for not moving out. Instead of a
penalty for breach, the tenant merely loses the bonus.
Avery Katz is a law and economics specialist, and more important
for this discussion, teaches contracts to law students at Columbia."' He
poses a similar problem to his students.67 First, he asks them whether
one can guarantee prompt performance from a building contractor by
providing that late performance will result in a 20% cut in the price.
The students correctly answer that such a penalty would be void if the
party's actual damages did not reasonably support the 20% claim.
Katz then asks them about cutting the price by 20% and providing a
20% bonus for on-time performance. He reports that students usually
see that simply cutting the price and relabeling the penalty as a bonus
cannot operate as an all-purpose method of evading the penalty
doctrine. Katz points out, however, that the question can be more
complicated because bonuses, as such, are legitimate and play valid
roles in contract law. He proposes that the distinction between
contract bonuses and penalties lies in their function, much as Judge
Posner distinguishes between penalties and valid liquidated damages.
68
A true bonus, Katz says, rewards the performing party beyond the
contract's fixed consideration for routine performance. 69
66. Columbia Law School, Full-Time Faculty,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/full-timefac?&main.find=k (last visited Feb. 8,
2007).
67. The following hypotheticals and discussions come from e-mail and telephone
discussions with Avery Katz. Telephone Interview with Avery Katz, Vice Dean and
Professor of Law, Columbia Law Sch. (July 28, 2006) (on file with author).
68. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-93 (7th Cir.
1985) (discussing the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages).
69. Professor Katz further explains that in using market value to distinguish a bonus
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Even with this explanation, distinguishing a bonus from a penalty
can be difficult. It is especially difficult in ad hoc contracts drawn from
scratch, such as an artist's agreement to paint a portrait or a builder's
agreement to construct a unique home. It becomes easier in open
market consumer contracts. In that setting, the bonus/penalty
distinction can be made by comparison of the contract's terms to
similar agreements in a broader market. In other words, if Pam
Martin's landlord claims that the $200 concession is a bonus for an
apartment renting for $975, what would that apartment bring in a
wider market sample? If the market value is $975, as the landlord
maintains, then the $200 concession is a bonus for Pam. If the market
value is $775, then Pam has not received a bonus but instead faces a
$200 penalty for breach.
This brings up a related point in Pam Martin's lease, which used
the term "market rent." Specifically, the Rent Concession and
Discount Addendum states that "[t]he monthly Market Rent amount
will be reduced by $200 during the initial lease term making the
monthly rent amount $775." The lease does not otherwise define the
term "market rent," and that term cannot be found in dictionaries,
including those focused on economics.
Consulting economics dictionaries and treatises does not advance
the analysis much further. For economists, the terms "value" and
"worth" are not precise terms of art. Economics references, if they
define these terms at all, do not provide consistent meanings.°
Instead, the terms are generic and mean what the speaker wants them
to mean, reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's approach to meaning. With
"value" and "worth" having no fixed meanings, what meaning should
from a penalty, he would be careful to obtain objective measures outside the parties'
viewpoints. Thus, in Pam's case he would accept neither the lease's $975 "market rate" nor
the parties' actual $775 transaction rate, but instead he would measure market value from
a sufficiently large number of similar rentals where the terms did not include the rent
concession or other bonus/penalty provisions. Katz points out that a problem occurs even
with this objective measure if all sellers in a given market recast their penalties as bonuses;
there, he would use the parties' actual transaction price to measure market value. No
public data is available as to how many apartment complexes in Texas use the Texas
Apartment Association's form lease with the rent concession clause. To the extent that use
is widespread, the measure of market value in Pam's case is $775. Katz, supra note 67.
70. See generally THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 446-47 (David
W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992) (defining "value"); WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES 726-27, 781 (1985) (discussing varying definitions of
"value" and "worth," but interestingly, the West reference does provide definitions for
"market value" and related terms; the apparent reason for the more precise definition
there is that "market value" is a legal term); 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 655 (Peter Newman ed., Vol. P-Z 1998) (defining "value
maximization").
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be given a contract in which the parties agree that (1) the market rent
is $975 a month, (2) but tenant will pay only $775 a month, unless (3)
tenant breaches, in which case tenant will pay $975 a month?
If a landlord believes an apartment is worth $1,000, but nobody is
willing to pay that, then the landlord's valuation is at best a subjective
one; it may be accurate as to the apartment's value to him but not for
prospective tenants in the market place. On the other hand, if a tenant
believes she should pay only $500 for an apartment, but no landlord
will rent at that price, then the tenant is wrong at least as to her sense
of market value. Although both landlord and tenant in this example
may validly claim that their disparate value settings are accurate for
them, those conclusions have little meaning outside their subjective
views. This approach to value is often called "intrinsic value."7 The
more objective approach is "exchange value," determined by what the
good or service brings in the marketplace." Although data is
unavailable to show which meaning of value is more often used to
measure damages, there will likely be little argument that exchange
value is appropriate for most contract damages. Exchange value is
determined when the buyer and seller agree on a price. Of course,
that value setting is true only for that one buyer and seller. Aggregate
value is determined by a collection of transactions.
If we assume that the lease's reference to "market rent" refers to
the average rental amount for similar apartments in a given
geographic market, this raises an interesting question. Can we believe
that the landlord willingly rents an apartment to Pam for $775 if it will
readily rent for $975? One argument is that the landlord has the
option of renting at a lower price and may do so for reasons other
than maximizing profit. Such motives may occur with individual
landlords renting single apartments but are far less likely in large
apartment complexes managed by an agent rather than the owner.
The not-interested-in-profits motive can also be tested by measuring
the frequency of rent concessions. How often does the landlord grant
one? No data is available on this, but it is significant that the rent-
concession language is printed on a form lease prepared by the Texas
Apartment Association. As noted above, the author's inquiry resulted
in numerous instances of leases with rent discounts, all re-imposable
71. See MIT DICrIONARY, supra note 70, at 446-47 (discussing definitions of
"value"); WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 726-27
(discussing definitions of "value").
72. See MIT DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 446-47 (discussing definitions of
"value"); WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 726-27
(discussing definitions of "value").
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under the terms of the lease.
It is highly unlikely that Pam's landlord made a concession only
for Pam or a few other tenants. The practice appears to be
widespread, and there are two plausible reasons for the practice-
puffery and penalties. As for puffery, rent concessions are a handy
marketing pitch. "This apartment is worth $1,000 a month, and if you
move in this month, you'll pay only $800." A more familiar example is
the car dealer who advertises the "list price" as $20,000 but sells the
car for $16,000. This differs from the Martin facts because the car sale
does not require the buyer pay the list price in the event of breach, but
the puffery is the same for both the landlord and the car dealer. In
both cases, the puffery, as such, is legal. The penalty function is illegal.
Neither the lease nor the car dealer's purchase agreement can require
the higher amount-the market rent or the car's list price-upon
breach.
Reliable data is available to support these market determinations
in specific cases. The market value of rental properties can be
determined at any given time with data from apartment rentals in a
defined area. That is not to say that rent-concession penalties can be
validated by market data. To the contrary, they remain penalties
because they do not reflect the landlord's actual losses. But if courts
or legislatures choose to view the rent concessions as bonuses rather
than penalties, the burden should rest on the landlord to prove market
value when seeking damages higher than the rent being paid by the
tenant.
V. WHY THESE CASES ARE NOT LITIGATED
It is unlikely the Martins will bring an action to reduce or clear
this debt. For Pam and any number of tenants, there are several
reasons why this issue does not find its way to court. One reason is
embarrassment from being in the wrong. As the collection company
urged both in its correspondence to Pam's father and to the Martins'
attorney, Pam breached an agreement. She signed a fourteen-month
lease and moved out after five. Even without the rent-concession
penalty and with the credit for reletting after two months, Pam owed
the landlord about $2,400. This includes two months' rent at $775, a
liquidated reletting fee of $824, and other fees related to the move-
out. What Pam should not owe is an extra $2,800 for the re-imposed
"market rent" on the full fourteen months or even a $1,400 re-
imposed rent concession for the seven months she lived there.
A second reason these penalties are not litigated is the tenant's
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belief that the law allows the penalty or their disbelief that a corporate
landlord would categorically pursue an illegal remedy. Tenants may
not imagine that the written contract could include illegal elements.
Whatever grousing tenants may do regarding landlords, there is
something persuasive about a printed lease, not to mention the
collection agency's demand letter. For Pam, the landlord's demand is
consistent with the contract's language. The tenant's misplaced faith is
reinforced by the near-total lack of public education on consumer
issues.
A third disincentive for consumer lawsuits is the relatively small
gain in the face of bigger losses. However valid this article's analysis,
its implementation requires a court to find that the contract is illegal.
To the extent that trial courts make literal rather than policy-oriented
decisions, the consumer's relief will more likely come from an
appellate court. If the Martins were to lose a lawsuit, they would owe
not only the full damages but attorney's fees as well. On the other
hand, if the Martins win the lawsuit, their damages under state and
federal law are only a few thousand dollars at best. This negative cost-
benefit analysis increases when the landlord (or seller in the larger
setting) drops the claim in the face of an attorney's letter, as Pam's
landlord did. In Pam's case, she would be taking on litigation to erase
a debt that is not being pursued at the moment, with little to win in
damages. But, the fact that the landlord momentarily drops the claim
does not mean that Pam and her parents are off the hook. The
collection business has become lucrative, with collectors now talking
of "regenerating" old debts.73
This third disincentive for tenant litigation-relatively low return
with high risk-should not be read as an argument that the damage
calculation should change. Current laws provide a reasonable penalty
and attorney's fees for consumer credit violations. This point is made
only to explain a likely reason for the nonlitigation of common wrongs
against tenants. These disincentives do not mean that the potential
litigation against re-imposed discounts lacks merit. To the contrary,
re-imposable discount provisions have become common. The setting is
ideal for a class action with both plaintiff and defendant classes.
If landlords are misusing rent concessions as penalties, and the
tenant's litigation remedy is problematic, why not resolve this
legislatively? Statutes banning ad terrorem remedies are not likely
feasible. Because of the significant gray area between valid liquidated
73. See Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens of Minn., Inc., No. 95 C 5374, 1996 WL 675787,
at * 3 (N.D. I11. 1996) (mer.).
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damages and penalties, it would be difficult to draft legislation that
would bar these penalties without circumventing legitimate remedies.
A possible solution is to draft the statute generally, barring the
recovery of contract damages beyond those actually suffered or
beyond reasonable estimates of liquidated damages. But, that
principle is already the law. Moreover, a principle this broad would
require case specific resolution-that is, litigation. The best remedy is
the one in place for four centuries-a broad common law rule echoed
in specific statutes such as U.C.C. section 2-718 and with statutory
exceptions where fines are appropriate.4
All this assumes the judicial and legislative review would support
the no-penalty principle. What if they do not? In the current wave of
anti-consumer reform, courts and legislatures could validate the use of
re-imposed rent concessions in spite of their irrelevance to any loss by
the seller and in spite of the Stewart v. Basey precedent. Not even the
economists who argue for party autonomy and the availability of
negotiated penalties push for that; instead, they argue merely that
penalties are valid in certain agreements between parties of somewhat
equal sophistication and bargaining strength.75 But statutes or court
74. For a discussion of U.C.C. section 2-718, see supra note 60. For examples of
statutory exceptions to the penalty rule, see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
75. For a convenient summary of the scholarly analyses of contract penalties, see
Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract Under the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 378, 386-87 (2005). Professor Katz's discussion cites to articles for and against
"supracompensatory damages" in both domestic and international commercial settings,
with little if any application to consumer sales. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 554-56
(1977); Samuel A. Rea, Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147, 147-48, 154-55 (1984); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as
Barriers to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 388-89, 398-99 (1987); Tai-Yeong Chung, On
the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damages Clauses: An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 280, 280-81 (1992); Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in
Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33, 33-36 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage
Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 369-75 (1990); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-
front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
98, 99 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies,
and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 479, 495 (1996); Eric Maskin & Jean
Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83, 83-
84 (1999); Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187,
2200-01 (2004); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1428-34 (2004); see
also note 7 and accompanying text. For an article addressing adhesion issues in consumer
contracts but not including penalties, see generally Symposium, "Boilerplate" Foundations
of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006) (discussing adhesion agreements with
no focused discussion of penalty damages).
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rulings endorsing consumer penalties in adhesion contracts are a
possibility, and arguments can be made for each of them. One is that
penalties have an ad terrorem function that promotes contract
compliance. So does debtor's prison or Shakespeare's pound of flesh.
How far are we willing to go?
Admittedly, incarceration is a harsher penalty than Pam's $2,800
rent concession. The question, then, is whether allowing consumer
penalties achieves the right balance. In weighing the merits, consider
that consumer penalties not only do the good of promoting contract
compliance but work the bad of giving the seller a motive to induce
breach or create circumstances where breach is likely. Landlords may
argue that they are not motivated to induce breach because contract
compliance is preferable to penalties that may not be collected. But
with credit reporting services at work, middle-class consumers have
little choice but to pay if they wish to maintain their credit. Consider
also the tenant who is forced into breach by circumstance. Here, the
tenant is exercising the efficient breach endorsed by Anglo-American
law for several hundred years. Penalties undermine that.76
The gain resulting from re-imposed rent concessions is at the
expense of an increasing consumer debt load. It produces ill effects
both on the broad economy and on the individual tenants unwise or
unlucky enough to breach. These ill effects are being exaggerated
because these disputes are not being litigated. This echoes a time
centuries ago when breaching parties with lesser leverage had to
reimburse the seller significantly more than the actual loss. Late
medieval England changed that, and the rule awaits enforcement.
76. For a discussion of efficient breaches, see Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.,
769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985); see generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 75 (discussing a
theory of efficient breach).
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